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ABSTRACT 
This paper estimates the incentive fees impact on hedge funds returns 
by estimating the factor model using gross return and net return respectively. 
We used the latest twelve year data, including the high volatile data of 2008 
and 2009, to do the regression. As a result, we find that the beta is 
underestimated from the regression, implying that the incentive fees do have 
the impact on hedge fund performance. Additionally, we adopted a rolling-over 
regression technique to duplicate the performance of the hedge funds using 
ten hedge fund strategies. We find that some additional beta return can be 
captured by replicating through the gross returns. In summary, the incentive 
fees should be taken into consideration when we are measuring the 
performances and risk exposures of the hedge funds. 
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1: Introduction 
In the current capital market, hedge funds play an important role, 
appealing us to investigate on it. After some deep research, we find that 
because of the option-like nature of the incentive fees, it creates a non-linear 
payoff to the factors which should be eliminated by using gross returns. In 
order to demonstrate our hypothesis, we adopted the paper conducted by 
Brooks, Clare and Motoson (2007) as our reference paper and we wanted to 
confirm the two main conclusions in their paper by using the latest 12-year 
data.  
For the first conclusion, they have pointed out that because of the 
existence of the incentive fees, the option-like nature of incentive fees creates 
a non-linear payoff to the factors which can be eliminated by using gross 
returns. Specifically, at first, they calculated the gross returns based on the 
data from 1994 to 2006 they have received from the TASS database. Then, 
they have performed a three-factor regression model to prove that the 
incentive fees have the impact on both alphas and betas with the major impact 
on alpha. The second conclusion was that some additional beta returns could 
be captured through the factor replication using the gross returns. They chose 
the specified factors for each hedge fund strategy and performed a 24-month 
rolling window regression repeatedly to demonstrate that the gross clones 
could capture the additional beta exposure. 
For our paper, we aim to testify these two conclusions based on the latest 
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12-year data including 2008 and 2009 which had a high volatility and we are 
interested in whether the conclusions would change based on the latest data. 
We mainly adopted the procedures mentioned in Brooks, Clare and Motoson 
(2007) except that we created our own method to calculate the gross returns 
for hedge fund indices. 
 At last, we demonstrated that the two conclusions are the same to the 
precedent paper even under the volatile years of 2008 and 2009, even though 
some strategies such as dedicated short bias and global macro performed 
better in this period whereas others performed worse. 
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2: Literature Review 
2.1 Hedge Funds Background 
Hedge funds play an important role in the capital market, which appeals 
us to dig on this area. As we can see that the amount invested globally in 
hedge funds rose from approximately $50 billion in 1990 to approximately $1 
trillion by the end of 2004. In addition, during 2004, trades by hedge funds 
often accounted for more than half of the total daily number of shares changing 
hands at NYSE. Moreover, even wealthy individual investors started to invest 
on hedge funds besides the large institutions.  
A hedge fund is an investment fund open to a limited range of investors 
that undertakes a wider range of investment and trading activities in addition to 
traditional long-only investment funds, and that, in general, pays a 
performance fee to its investment manager. We then can see the economic 
function of hedge funds from this definition is that fund managers have the 
responsibility to guarantee that the invested capital obtained from investors 
could receive back and earn a healthy return. 
Alfred W. Jones was generally considered as the pioneer to start the first 
hedge fund in 1949. Since then, especially since the turn of the century, the 
investments on hedge funds have exploded.  
Compared to mutual funds, coexisted with hedge funds in the capital 
market, hedge fund managers typically have the rights to have short positions, 
to borrow, and to make extensive use of derivatives. Therefore, the hedge 
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funds return and diversification benefits depend on the skills of managers, to a 
large extent. 
2.2 Methodology of Measuring Hedge Fund Returns 
Classic performance measurements, including the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) and Fama–French four-factor model, are widely adopted for 
calculating hedge fund returns. 
The most widely known performance measurement is the Sharpe ratio, 
which measures the relationship between the excess return and the standard 
deviation of the returns generated by a fund (Sharpe, 1966). However, Eling 
and Schuhmacher (2007) pointed out the drawbacks of the Sharpe ratio. Only 
if the hedge fund returns are normally distributed and the investors are willing 
to invest all their risky assets into just one fund, will the Sharpe Ratio be the 
accurate performance measurement. 
In addition, under the situation that only a small portion of the investors‟ 
wealth is allocated to the hedge funds, Jensen (1968) first applied of a linear 
factor model to measure the managed portfolios performance. However, it was 
challenged by the subsequent empirical work about the ability of the CAPM to 
capture systematic variation in asset returns. 
On the other hand, multifactor model is the most obvious method to 
estimate the hedge fund returns. Kristien and Jan (2006) introduced Dynamic 
Investment Strategies of Hedge Funds. Fung and Hsieh (2002), for example, 
adopted an asset-class multifactor model and Edwards and Caglayan (2001), 
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on the other hand, employed the Fama-French style risk factors. 
2.3 Performance Attribution 
Traditionally, hedge fund returns are just attributed to alpha and beta 
(A&B). However, hedge fund managers switch between asset classes, hold 
long as well as short positions, use leverage and derivatives resulting in highly 
non-linear payoff structures. Hence, Ibbotson and Chen (2006) decomposed 
hedge fund returns into their three components: the value added by hedge 
fund managers (alphas), the systematic market risks (betas), and the hedge 
fund fees (costs). 
They constructed ten equally weighted indices of the hedge funds and 
chose three factors which represented traditional stock, bond and cash to 
perform the regression based on the model of Sharpeee (1992) for the 
analysis of mutual funds. The results indicated that the alphas were 
significantly positive and closed to the fees after the adjustment of the data 
biases, which meant that the investors and the hedge fund managers captured 
the approximately equivalent excess returns. 
2.4 Impact of Incentive Fees 
As was mentioned above, the factor models are the mainstream 
methods used to reach the results of the performance attribution of the hedge 
funds. However, Brooks, Clare and Motson (2007) found that use the net of the 
fee returns would underestimate the factor exposures (betas) due to the 
option-like nature of incentive fees. They used a large sample of hedge funds, 
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eleven factors and one month USD LIBOR to perform a three-factor model 
regression and a factor model replication. The results were that the return 
caused by beta would be underestimated by approximately 58 basis points per 
annum if the net of the fee returns were used to do the regression. They also 
demonstrated that replicating the hedge fund performance using the gross 
returns rather than the net returns can capture a part of the additional beta 
exposure. As a result, they suggested that using the gross returns of the hedge 
funds to perform the regression at first, which can eliminate the impact of the 
incentive fees, and then modeling the incentive fees independently to yield a 
more accurate relationship between the risks and returns for investors. 
2.5 Hedge Fund Performance Replication  
If the additional beta exposure can be captured by the replication on the 
gross returns, we will be interested in whether the hedge fund returns can be 
replicated. In this field, Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006) said that the performance 
of the hedge fund can be replicated using the liquid exchange-traded 
instruments to make up the portfolios with the similar risk exposures. Though 
the clones may be useless for some strategies like Event Driven and Emerging 
markets, most of the clones can track the corresponding hedge fund returns. 
They chose six factors to do the fixed-weight and the rolling-window clones 
respectively. As a result, they mentioned that the rolling window clones were 
better than the fixed-weight clones in that the fixed-weight clones were 
suffered by look-ahead bias due to the weights of the clones‟ portfolio as well 
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as the renormalization factors were constructed through the full-time data of 
fund and factor returns. The rolling window regression could address this 
problem and yield a higher R square to improve the results. In summary, they 
concluded that cloning the hedge fund returns is feasible though there are 
some differences of the performance of clones across hedge-fund strategies. 
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3: Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
The data used in this paper comes from three sources which are 
HedgeFund.net database, Bloomberg database and Morningstar database. 
In order to find the impact of the incentive fees for hedge funds, we 
have chosen the monthly net returns of ten equally weighted hedge fund 
strategy indices from the HedgeFund.net database. The data used in our 
paper lasted from January 1998 to December 2009, which is the latest twelve 
year data, whereas the data adopted by the precedent paper was from 1994 to 
2006. It should be mentioned that this DataStream including the data of 2008 
and 2009, which had a high volatility.  
The ten indices include 3,909 hedge funds which are all survived funds. 
We do not select the removed hedge funds because we are focus on the 
impact of the incentive fees which are more likely to be paid by the survived 
hedge funds. The survivorship bias will not seriously affect the results. 
We have chosen eleven factors which is shown in Table 4 plus the one 
month USD LIBOR which is the leverage factor for the purpose of the 
performance attribution and the factor model replication. The eleven factors 
are shown in the Table 4. We have found the total return of the Finex-US Dollar 
index and GSCI Commodity Index from the Bloomberg. The total return of 
other nine factors plus the data of the one month USD LIBOR was found 
through the Morningstar database. We have used these twelve factors to 
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perform the regression with the net returns and gross returns of the hedge 
funds respectively to prove what we have hypothesized. 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Calculating the Net and Gross Hedge Fund Returns 
In order to demonstrate the first conclusion in the precedent paper that 
eliminate the impact of the incentive fee by using the gross returns of hedge 
funds to perform the regression model, we need to obtain the net and gross 
hedge fund returns at first. 
First of all, we have obtained the monthly net returns of the ten equally 
weighted hedge fund strategy indices. Then, we have estimated the gross 
returns of these ten indices by using the net returns, average level of the 
management fees and incentive fees. The management fees are calculated on 
a monthly basis.  
The procedures we adopted here are as follows: 
(1). We have set the initial NAV of the hedge fund index to be one. After that, it 
is easy to estimate the NAV for each month using the net returns and the initial 
NAV. According to the formula, 
      
             
      
 
(2). If the NAV of the current month belows the highest NAV of the previous 
months, the gross return of the current month will simply be the net return of 
the current month plus the calculated monthly management fee. 
(3). If the NAV of the current month is higher than the highest NAV of the 
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previous months, the gross return of the current month will be the sum of the 
net return of the current month, the monthly management fee and the incentive 
fee, which is simply the product of the average level of the incentive fees 
(i.e.20%) and the net return of that month. 
3.2.2 Conducting Performance Attribution by Regression Model 
After we got the net returns and gross returns, we moved to the critical 
part of performance attribution. In this part, we adopted the Brooks, Clare and 
Motson (2007)‟s methodology. In order to analyze the performance attribution 
based on net and gross returns, we performed regressions on net and gross 
hedge fund returns respectively, using the S&P 500 index total returns, the 
Barclays Capital US Aggregate Bond Index total returns and the one month 
USD LIBOR as the stocks, bonds and cash benchmarks. The time series 
lasted from January 1998 to December 2009. The weights of the three factors 
should be constrained to sum to one with each style weights to be negative or 
positive in this regression model.  
The model used here was a very simple regression model based on the 
framework of Sharpeee (1992) for mutual funds. The model was: 
                  
 
   
 
Where  
α is the abnormal return 
Rt represents the net or gross return of the hedge fund strategy for period t 
Fi,t represents the return of the factor Fi for period t 
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βi,t represents the hedge fund strategy‟s sensitivity to factor Fi at time t 
After the alphas and betas were calculated, we then made a comparison 
between those of net returns and gross returns to see whether the betas are 
underestimated and the changes of the alphas. At last, we extracted the 
alphas from the net and gross returns to yield the returns from the betas. The 
fees component in the gross returns was simply the difference between the 
gross and net hedge fund returns for each strategy. However, the fees 
component in the net returns was estimated by using the median management 
and incentive fee levels. As a result, we decomposed the returns of the hedge 
funds into three components: alpha, beta and fees. 
3.2.3 Duplicating Performance of Hedge Fund by Factor Model 
There are three hedge fund replication methods, rule-based, 
factor-based, and distribution replicating approaches. In this part, we tried to 
testify the second conclusion mentioned in our precedent paper that use the 
gross returns and net returns to duplicate the performance of the hedge fund 
respectively by the method adopted by Hasanhodzica and Lo (2006), that is by 
the factor-based hedge fund replication method, which seeks to replicate 
hedge fund accessibility to alternative risk premium and control exposures to 
risk factors. 
However, in the process of selecting the specified factors for each hedge 
fund strategy, we used the results which are shown in Table 5 yielded by 
Brooks, Clare and Motson (2007) rather than the procedures adopted by 
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Hasanhodzica and Lo.. Brooks, Clare and Motson ran regressions used the all 
possible combinations of the eleven factors to indentify the specific factors for 
each strategy. After determined the factors for each strategy, we then did the 
rolling window clones used the identified factors plus the one month USD 
LIBOR for each hedge fund index as well as the broad index. The one month 
USD LIBOR is a factor accounting for the shorting and leverage. The 
procedures are as follows: 
(1) At first, we used net returns and gross returns of each hedge fund strategy 
as well as the broad hedge fund index to run a 24-month rolling window 
regression based on the data from January 1998 to December 2009. The 
equations were:  
                 
 
    And        
 
    
Where 
α is the abnormal return 
Rt represents the net or gross return of the hedge fund strategy for period t 
Fi,t represents the return of the factor Fi for period t 
βi,t represents the hedge fund strategy‟s sensitivity to factor Fi at time t 
       
 
    Can be achieved by using the 1 month USD LIBOR factor 
(2) The regression coefficients β i,t were then used as the clone portfolio 
weights to calculate the rough clone returns    
  through the equation: 
   
      
 
 
   
     
(3) A renormalization was needed here to match the volatility of the clone 
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returns and the hedge fund returns, thus, create a fair comparison. The 
renormalization factor     were then calculated by the following equation: 
    
                
  
   
 
  
         
      
       
 
  
 
(4) At last, we used this leverage factor and the previous calculated clone 
returns to calculate the final clone returns      using the following equation: 
            
                 
We repeated this procedure for each rolling window, hedge fund strategy 
as well as the broad hedge fund index using both net and gross returns. As a 
result, we can obtain the clone returns for each strategy and the broad hedge 
fund index for 10 years from January 2000 to December 2009. 
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4: Results and Analysis 
      According to the procedures mentioned above (Chapter 3), we 
calculated the results and put it into Appendix in order to compare them to that 
of the precedent paper and then testify the points of the view.  
4.1 Properties of Net and Gross Returns 
As we can see from Table 1, it is obvious that the compound annual 
gross returns are higher than the net returns due to the fees charged by hedge 
funds. The average fee charged in our sample is 4.50% per annum.  
Then, we also can see from Table 1 that there are some statistical 
properties of net and gross returns. And we used the value of three critical 
items to judge the „normal‟ level of both net and gross returns.  
The annualized standard deviation of the gross returns is higher than 
that of the net returns for all hedge fund strategies with an average level of 
0.38%. When it comes to the skewness and kurtosis, the results in the Table 1 
show that all the hedge fund indices as well as the broad index have the higher 
skewness of the gross returns, however, some strategies have the higher 
kurtosis and some strategies have the lower kurtosis. As a whole, there is an 
average increase of 0.29 for the skewness and an average reduction of 0.96 
for the kurtosis of the gross returns compared with those of the net returns in 
our sample.  
In summary, it seems that the distribution of the gross returns is more 
“normal” than that of the net returns. This result is almost as same as that of 
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Brooks, Clare and Motson (2007) except that almost all the strategies had 
lower net and gross returns compared with those of their paper. However, the 
dedicated short bias and global macro have higher returns. The reason is 
clearly the 2008 financial crisis which made the hedge funds have very bad 
performance. But the dedicated short bias obtained very high return in 2008, 
which is in line with our expectation. 
4.2 Results of Performance Attribution 
The results of the regression model in 3.2.2 were shown in Table 2 and 
Table 3. As we can see from the Table 2, the average increase of the alpha in 
our sample is 4.01%, which is much larger than the average level of the 
management fee (i.e.2%). Moreover, the alphas are significantly positive at the 
5% significance level for all hedge fund strategies when we used the gross 
returns to perform the regression. In addition, we want to mention that the 
significance results of alphas are the same to that in the reference paper. 
Therefore, the hedge fund managers do add the returns to the hedge funds 
and the impact of the incentive fees are obviously on alphas.  
When it refers to the beta, the magnitude of the systematic betas for all 
the ten hedge fund indices as well as the whole sample is greater if the gross 
returns are used to perform the regressions, which means that the hedge 
funds managers take more risk when the incentive fees are under 
consideration. Thus, using the gross returns to perform the regression may 
yield the more accurate results. The R-square value is volatile for all the hedge 
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fund strategies. Some strategies have relatively high R-square value such as 
dedicated short bias, emerging markets, event driven and long short equity. 
Others have a relatively low R-square value, which is in line with the results in 
Brooks, Clare and Motson (2007). The results in Table 2 are as same as the 
results in Brooks, Clare and Motson (2007). 
According to Table 3, after we decomposed the hedge fund returns into 
three components, the returns attributable to the alpha and beta are both 
larger with an average level of 4.01% and 0.49% respectively. This result 
means that the beta will be underestimated if we use the net of the fee returns 
to perform the regression. Thus, the impact of the incentive fees is indeed on 
both alpha and beta with the major impact on the alpha.  
The results in this table is almost as same as that of Brooks, Clare and 
Motson (2007) except that the gross returns which are grossed up through the 
estimated fees are lower than the gross returns for almost all the hedge fund 
strategies. However, in the precedent paper, some strategies have higher 
gross returns which are grossed up through the estimated fees with others do 
not have. It is the results of the decreased compound annual returns for almost 
all the strategies, which make the incentive fees component decreased as 
well. 
In sum, we therefore testified the first conclusion in the precedent paper 
with the latest data.  
4.3 Results of the Factor Model Replication 
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As was mentioned above, the beta will be underestimated if we use the 
net of fee returns for the performance attribution. Therefore, we used the gross 
returns to do the replication in order to capture the additional beta return and 
eliminate the impact of the incentive fees which create the non-linear payoff 
between the hedge fund returns and the factors.  
As we can see in Table 6, the compound annual gross clone returns are 
greater in magnitude than the net clones for all indices as well as the broad 
hedge fund index. The average increase of the gross clones over the net 
clones is 0.38% though the standard deviation of the gross clone returns is 
also slightly higher. The performance is improved in the factor replication 
model for all the hedge fund strategy indices, which means that the result is 
better than that of the regression performed based on the three factors for all 
the hedge fund strategies. 
We can find that for some strategies, the clone portfolios are able to 
replicate the actual returns, while for other strategies, the difference between 
the clone portfolio and the actual return is substantial. Specifically, the 
emerging market and long/short equity are improved obviously with the 
extreme high R-square values, however, some strategies such as convertible 
arbitrage and managed futures, which have the much lower R-square values, 
have a very limited improvement. And these results are the same to that in the 
precedent paper. In our opinions, combined with the further research, the 
mis-estimation of the current exposures to factors caused the failure to track 
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hedge fund returns. Moreover, there is not a prefect way to replicate hedge 
fund returns and we need to choose an appropriate one according to certain 
circumstances. But, as long as the returns of hedge funds are appealing, 
hedge fund clone products would still prove beneficial and useful. In addition, 
the correlation between the clone returns and the hedge fund indices returns 
are 80.42% and 81.75% for gross and net returns respectively, which implies 
the replication is successful. 
In summary, the results in this table are almost as same as those of the 
precedent paper and we can capture the additional beta return through the 
gross return replication. Because of the improved the performance of the 
regression model, this factor replication model further confirms the result that 
the incentive fees do have the impact on the risk exposures of hedge funds. 
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5: Conclusions 
In our paper, we want to demonstrate the two conclusions drawn in 
Brooks, Clare and Motson (2007). The first one is that the impact of the 
incentive fees makes the beta underestimated and therefore it cannot be 
ignored and the second one is that the duplication of performance of the hedge 
funds by the hedge funds gross returns can capture the additional beta 
returns.  
At first, we calculated the gross returns for each hedge fund strategy as 
well as the broad index. We find that the distribution of the gross returns are 
more “normal” than that of the net of fee returns according to the critical 
indications, such as standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis. This result in 
our paper is the same to that in the precedent paper, with most strategies have 
lower compound annual returns because of the bad hedge funds performance 
in 2008.  
Then, we used both gross returns and net returns to perform a three 
factor regression model respectively in order to analyze the performance 
attribution. We find that the use of the net returns would underestimate the 
return attributable to beta and the incentive fees do have the impact on the 
hedge funds, which are consistent to what we have expected as well as the 
precedent paper. In this part, the gross returns which were estimated based on 
the average level of management and incentive fees are lower for most 
strategies. This result is different from that of the precedent paper due to the 
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decreased compound annual returns for most of the hedge fund returns.  
After demonstrating that the impact of the incentive fees is really on 
both alpha and beta, we carried out a factor model replication to see whether 
some additional beta returns could be captured and confirm the previous 
results further. We find that we could capture the additional beta returns using 
the factor model replication based on the gross returns and confirm our 
expectation further by the improved performance (higher R-square values) in 
the model. This result is also in line with that of the precedent paper.     
We try to figure out the reason why the results are not changed and we 
think that even though the hedge funds had very bad performance in 2008, 
hedge funds had very good performance in 2009. Some hedge funds had 
much higher compound annual returns in 2009 than that of the 2008, which 
made the hedge funds suffered from the impact of the incentive fees in the 
latest twelve years as well as the these two high volatile years. Therefore, the 
impact of the incentive fees on the hedge fund performance measurement is 
very obvious and should be estimate independently. 
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Table 1 
Statistical Properties of Net and Gross Returns 
For the whole sample, compared to net returns, gross returns exhibit higher 
annualized standard deviation, higher skewness and lower kurtosis, 
suggesting a more „normal‟ distribution of gross returns. 
 
Net Return 
 Compound  
Annual Ret 
Annualized  
Std. Dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Convertible Arb 8.35% 6.85% -2.99 19.27 
Dedicated Short Bias 3.20% 14.70% 0.63 1.55 
Emerging MKTs 12.78% 14.97% -1.22 4.41 
Equity MKT Neutral 7.13% 2.88% -0.19 3.06 
Event Driven 9.04% 6.85% -1.17 3.42 
Fixed Income Arb 6.91% 4.50% -3.79 22.74 
Global Macro 10.83% 5.23% 0.797 1.55 
Long Short Equity 12.35% 9.24% 0.21 2.63 
Managed Futures 9.76% 8.39% 0.45 0.20 
Multi Strategy 10.57% 6.50% 0.24 3.21 
All Hedge Funds 9.39% 4.15% -0.78 4.19 
 
 
 
Gross Return 
 Compound  
Annual Ret 
Annualized  
Std. Dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Convertible Arb 12.40% 7.12% -2.77 16.96 
Dedicated Short Bias 6.58% 15.50% 0.89 2.61 
Emerging MKTS 18.50% 15.75% -1.01 3.87 
Equity MKT Neutral 10.92% 3.29% 0.15 2.41 
Event Driven 13.34% 7.33% -0.94 2.60 
Fixed Income Arb 10.54% 4.67% -3.55 20.69 
Global Macro 15.61% 6.06% 1.01 1.85 
Long Short Equity 17.66% 10.29% 0.59 3.14 
Managed Futures 14.53% 9.42% 0.69 0.54 
Multi Strategy 15.37% 7.30% 0.60 3.52 
All Hedge Funds 13.89% 4.53% -0.49 3.23 
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Table 2 
Regression Results for Equally Weighted Hedge Fund Indices 
For our sample, using gross returns, alphas are significant at the 5% 
significance level for all 10 strategies and the magnitude of betas for the risky 
assets (stocks and bonds) is also greater. 
 
 
 
 
Regression Results: 1998-2009 
 Compound 
Annual 
Return 
Annual 
Alpha 
Betas (sum of Betas = 1) 
Stocks Bonds Cash RSQ 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
Net Return 8.35% 3.62% 0.1906 0.3201 0.4893 23.56% 
Gross Return 12.40% 6.99% 0.1978 0.3225 0.4797 23.29% 
Dedicated 
Short Bias 
Net Return 3.20% 7.14% -0.7437 0.0417 1.7020 69.68% 
Gross Return 6.58% 11.38% -0.7879 0.0929 1.6950 70.48% 
Emerging 
Markets 
Net Return 12.78% 3.13% 0.5932 -0.0254 0.4322 42.72% 
Gross Return 18.50% 8.24% 0.6165 -0.0636 0.4471 41.78% 
Equity Market 
Neutral 
Net Return 7.13% 3.79% 0.0530 0.0912 0.8558 10.31% 
Gross Return 10.92% 6.95% 0.0584 0.0980 0.8436 9.54% 
Event Driven Net Return 9.04% 3.30% 0.2939 -0.0551 0.7611 50.38% 
Gross Return 13.34% 6.78% 0.3097 -0.0806 0.7709 48.84% 
Fixed Income 
Arbitrage 
Net Return 6.91% 3.61% 0.0706 0.1592 0.7702 8.18% 
Gross Return 10.54% 6.80% 0.0729 0.1671 0.7600 8.17% 
Global Macro Net Return 10.83% 3.45% 0.1189 0.2547 0.6264 16.85% 
Gross Return 15.61% 7.64% 0.1337 0.2684 0.5980 15.54% 
Long/Short 
Equity 
Net Return 12.35% 5.04% 0.3980 -0.0203 0.6223 50.51% 
Gross Return 17.66% 9.54% 0.4242 -0.0553 0.6311 46.39% 
Managed 
Futures 
Net Return 9.76% 3.04% -0.0798 0.5104 0.5694 7.76% 
Gross Return 14.53% 7.48% -0.0965 0.5684 0.5281 8.09% 
Multi-Strategy Net Return 10.57% 5.48% 0.2517 0.0967 0.6516 40.81% 
Gross Return 15.37% 9.74% 0.2735 0.0888 0.6377 38.17% 
All Hedge 
Funds 
Net Return 9.39% 3.23% 0.1146 0.1373 0.7480 21.93% 
Gross Return 13.89% 7.24% 0.1202 0.1406 0.7391 20.19% 
23 
 
Table 3  
Performance Attribution for Equally Weighted Hedge Fund 
Indices 
Systematic betas are underestimated based on the net returns compared to 
those of the gross returns and the average increase of the alpha in our sample 
is 4.01%, which is much larger than the average level of the management fee 
(2%) 
 
Source of Return: Alpha, Beta and Cost 1998-2009   
  Pre-Fee  
Return 
Fees Post-Fee 
Return 
Alpha Systematic 
Betas 
Convertible 
Arb 
Net Return 12.44% 4.09%  8.35%  3.62%  4.73% 
Gross Return 12.40% 4.05%  8.35% 6.99%  5.41% 
Dedicated 
Short Bias 
Net Return 6.00% 2.8%  3.20% 7.14% -3.94% 
Gross Return 6.58% 3.38%  3.20%  11.38% -4.80% 
Emerging 
MKTs 
Net Return 17.98% 5.20% 12.78%  3.13%  9.65% 
Gross Return 18.50% 5.72%  12.78%  8.24% 10.26% 
Equity MKT 
Neutral 
Net Return 10.91% 3.78% 7.13%  3.79%  3.34% 
Gross Return 10.92% 3.79%  7.13%  6.95%  3.97% 
Event Driven Net Return 13.30% 4.26%  9.04%  3.30%  5.74% 
Gross Return 13.34% 4.30%  9.04%  6.78%  6.56% 
Fixed Income 
Arb 
Net Return 10.64% 3.73%  6.91% 3.61%  3.30% 
Gross Return 10.54% 3.63%  6.91%  6.80%  3.74% 
Global Macro Net Return 15.54% 4.71%  10.83%  3.45%  7.38% 
Gross Return 15.61% 4.78%  10.83%  7.64%  7.97% 
Long/Short 
Equity 
Net Return 17.44% 5.09%  12.35%  5.04%  7.31% 
Gross Return 17.66% 5.31%  12.35%  9.54%  8.12% 
Managed 
Futures 
Net Return 14.20% 4.44%  9.76%  3.04%  6.72% 
Gross Return 14.53% 4.77%  9.76%  7.48%  7.05% 
Multi-Strategy Net Return 15.21% 4.64%  10.57%  5.48%  5.09% 
Gross Return 15.37% 4.80%  10.57%  9.74%  5.63% 
All Hedge 
Funds 
Net Return 13.74% 4.35%  9.39%  3.23%  6.16% 
Gross Return 13.89% 4.50%  9.39%  7.24%  6.65% 
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Table 4  
Selected Factors for Replication 
There are 11 candidate factors which provide a broad cross section of risk 
exposures. These factors are sorted into two groups: those that require 
investment and those that are cash neutral. 
 
Factors Requiring Investment 
Name Description Data Stream  
Mnemonic 
MKT S&P 500 WILEQTY 
CMDITY GSCI Commodity Total Return GSCITOT 
BOND Barclay Capital Aggregate Total Return LHAGGBD 
EMERGING MSCI Emerging Markets Index Total Return MSEMKFL 
GLOBAL 
STOCKS 
JP Morgan Global Broad Excluding U.S. Total 
Return 
JPMBXUS 
GLOBAL 
BONDS 
MSCI World Excluding U.S. Total Return MSWFXU 
DVIX Change In CBOE VIX Index CBOEVIX 
 
Cash Neutral Factors 
Name Description Data Stream  
Mnemonic 
SMB S&P 500 Small Cap Minus S&P 500 Large 
Cap (Both Total Return) 
WILEQTY&WILDJLC 
USD Finex-US Dollar Index Return NDXCS00 
CREDIT Barclay Capital Credit Intermediate Bond 
Index Minus Barclay Capital Government 
Intermediate (Both Total Return) 
LHCRPIN&LHGOVIN 
SLOPE Barclay Capital Treasury: 20+ Year Index 
Minus Barclay Capital Short Treasury Index 
(Both Total Return) 
LHTR20Y&LHSHORT 
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Table 5  
Results of Factor Selection 
This table shows the specified factors for each hedge fund index. The result 
was quoted from Brooks, Clare and Motson (2007). 
 
  MKT SMB USD CMD
TY 
BO
ND 
CRE
DIT 
SLO
PE 
EMER
GING  
GLOBAL-
STOCKS 
GLOBAL
-BONDS 
DVIX 
Conver
tible 
Arb 
       
-0.16
76 
   
4.77
82 
         
0.33
58 
Dedica
ted 
Short 
Bias 
 
-0.47
04 
                    
Emergi
ng 
MKT 
 
0.17
41 
         
1.79
49 
   
0.191
8 
      
Equity 
MKT 
neutral 
 
0.99
76 
 
0.21
39 
   
0.09
03 
            0.02
19  
Event 
Driven 
0.14
32  
  0.09
79  
   
0.25
97 
 
1.37
47 
   
0.058
9 
     
0.03
73 
Fixed 
Income 
Arb 
     
0.35
30 
-0.11
30 
   
1.57
06 
       0.5375  
-0.07
04 
Global 
Macro 
   
-0.20
30 
       
2.42
84 
   
0.073
1 
 -0.1027  0.3253   
Long 
Short 
Equity 
 
0.26
98 
 
0.18
95 
 
0.13
87 
 
0.08
00 
     
0.08
90 
 
0.077
1 
 -0.0388  0.1854   
Manag
ed 
Future
s 
     
0.43
79 
         
0.000
0 
 -0.1298  0.6477   
Multi-s
trategy 
     
0.38
73 
 
0.13
02 
 
0.73
22 
-3.6
661  
   
0.148
5 
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Table 6  
Results of the Factor Model Replication 
In all cases, the returns of the gross clones are greater in magnitude than 
those of the net clones, demonstrating that the additional beta returns could be 
captured by gross returns rather than net returns. 
 
Regression Results: 1998-2009 
  Index Clone 
  
  
Compou
nd  
Annual 
Return 
Annual 
Standar
d 
Deviati
on 
Compou
nd  
Annual 
Return 
Annual 
Standar
d 
Deviati
on 
Mean R2 
of 
Regressi
on 
Correlati
on 
Between 
Clone & 
Index 
Convertibl
e Arb 
NR 7.57% 7.27%  4.98%  11.13% 35.30%  47.72%  
GR 11.45%  7.53% 5.74%  12.21%  34.56%  46.18%  
Dedicated 
Short Bias 
NR 3.18% 13.98%  -0.58%  22.23%  77.80%  83.29% 
GR 6.30% 14.44%  -1.73%  22.63%  78.49%  83.87%  
Emerging 
MKTs 
NR 13.97% 12.88% 7.78%  14.04%  92.64%  85.88%  
GR 19.95% 13.62%  12.56%  15.42%  91.97%  80.72%  
Equity MKT 
Neutral 
NR 5.67% 2.60% 5.28%  3.40%  45.79%  40.62%  
GR 9.10% 2.92% 8.88% 3.68% 45.65% 42.87%  
Event 
Driven 
NR 8.41% 6.51%  5.04%  7.67% 86.51% 77.72% 
GR 12.57% 6.96% 5.89% 8.18% 85.10% 76.36% 
Fixed 
Income Arb 
NR 6.87% 3.64%  5.70%  4.49%  48.67%  38.02%  
GR 10.53% 3.83% 5.82% 4.54% 48.54% 37.45% 
Global 
Macro 
NR 9.11% 4.64%  9.18%  7.52%  71.07%  48.73%  
GR 13.50% 5.32%  10.86%  8.75%  70.91%  45.77%  
Long/Short 
Equity 
NR 8.34% 8.12%  1.59%  9.86%  95.32%  87.67% 
GR 12.67% 8.85% 1.77% 11.14% 94.24% 85.80% 
Managed 
Futures 
NR 8.94% 8.44%  9.35% 9.78% 34.52% 40.45% 
GR 13.55% 9.42%  10.46%  11.20%  33.75%  40.66%  
Multi 
Strategy 
NR 8.61% 5.89% 5.28% 6.35% 77.69%  66.29% 
GR 12.97% 6.51%  5.81% 6.93% 77.19%  62.97% 
All Hedge 
Funds  
NR 8.31% 3.98% 4.46% 4.33% 90.31% 81.75% 
GR 12.53% 4.30% 4.94% 4.99% 89.49% 80.42% 
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